| Περίληψη : | The purpose of this dissertation is to present basic models dealing with the Strategic Trade Policy of governments, interfering with the free functioning of markets.The need for the development of such models stems generally from the observation that the Walrasian models cannot satisfactorily address all questions that may arise regarding the functioning and operation of markets. The existence of imperfect markets, the small number of firms which are no longer price takers, the increasing returns to scale in the production process, are all issues that depart from the standard Walresian set-up. This in turn, has raised the question of whether government intervention is necessary with a view of turning such distortions and market imperfections into the country’s advantage, increasing its welfare.The first chapter of this thesis presents models of strategic trade policy in the production of a homogeneous product. Specifically, the first section deals with models in which firms compete in a third importing market. It is shown that in such models, governments have an incentive to set export subsidies, with the aim of increasing the market share and profits of their domestic firms. In fact, profits are increased by more than subsidy payments which leads to an increase in domestic welfare. The second section of the chapter looks into reciprocal dumping models, i.e., a two-way trade between countries of an (almost) identical product. A key question is how is it possible that the free-on-board (f.o.b.) price set by an exporting firm may be lower than that in which it sells in its domestic market –which is the essence of “dumping”. Finally, it examines the role of “anti-dumping” duties set by governments and whether these increase domestic welfare. The third section of this chapter looks into other models such as, for instance, the case of import tariffs in strategic environments, the MFN Principle of WTO, the issue of delegating authority in customs unions, etc. The second chapter presents models of strategic trade policy in models with differentiated products. In the first section using the models of Krugman(1979) and Lancaster (1980) who developed trade models with differentiated products, based on the Chamberlinian interpretation of monopolistic competition, there is an introduction that explains the reason for intra-industry trade with differentiated products. Then, based on the above conclusions, there is a presentation of models that explain whether it is necessary or not to have a strategic trade policy. The second section looks into models presenting the trade policy in oligopolistic markets with differentiated products. Finally, the third chapter presents models of strategic trade policy under asymmetric information and under uncertainty for demand
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